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Acquisition of Corporations: The Ramifications of

Federal Regulation of State Tender Offer Statutes
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last twenty years, a device known as the tender offer
has become a frequently used method of acquiring corporations.'
As a transaction involving securities, it is now subject to federal
regulation. 2 Since it involves corporate activity, it is subject to
state regulation as well. It is the purpose of this comment to illuminate the existing tensions between these bodies of law.
In a tender offer, the entity seeking to take over a corporation
makes an offer directly to the corporation's shareholders for the
purchase of their securities in the target company. This has the
advantage of circumventing incumbent management and allowing
the tender offeror to seize control of the target quickly, without the
expense and turmoil of a bitter proxy contest,3 and without making
any commitments to incumbent management.
The offeror's greatest tactical advantages are speed and secrecy.
The initial blow is a public offer at premiums sometimes phenomenally exceeding the prevailing market price,4 which prompts shareholders to sell large blocks of their holdings within just a few days,
1. See generally Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. REv.
135 (1967) (discussion of the proliferation of cash tender offers); Austin, Study Reveals
Trends in Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1978, at 34, col. 1.
2. Prior to the Williams Act, adopted in 1968, tender offers were not subject to federal
regulation. Chief Justice Burger later described the business conditions that necessitated
the Act as follows: "The proliferation of cash tender offers, in which publicized requests are
made and intensive campaigns conducted for tenders of shares of stock at a fixed price,
removed a substantial number of corporate control contests from the reach of existing disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
3. A proxy contest has been described as "'an internal struggle between two or more
groups, one usually being the incumbent management and board of directors, for the control
of the board of directors ... ,' the purpose of which is to remove incumbent management
and 'replace them with a slate of directors nominated by the acquiring company ....
'
Comment, Corporate Takeoever Battles-Shark Repellent Charter and Bylaw Provisions
that Deter Hostile Tender Offers or Other Acquisitions-A Comprehensive Examination,
27 How. L.J. 1683, 1684-85 n.3 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98.247 at 91,624 (E.D.
La. May 3, 1979) (premium of 74.4% over current market price offered by Brascan Holdings, Inc. in its takeover bid for F.W. Woolworth Co.).
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and, if enough shares are tendered, allows the offeror to quickly
gain control of the target company and replace the incumbent
management before it can take defensive action.5 For target management to mount any defenses requires time, and for this reason,
it strives to delay the offer. 6
Tender offers have been both hailed as playing "an important
role in the health of the national economy" 7 and criticized as the
tool of corporate raiders. 8 One universal concern has been the welfare of the target shareholders. 9 As target management fights for
what it believes to be in the best interest of the corporation,10
which usually involves retention of control,"' and the offeror fights
to seize control of the corporation, the shareholder gets trapped in
the middle. Congress, fearing that the seductive premiums and
high-pressure tactics characteristic of tender offers would force
shareholders into making hasty and uninformed investment decisions, promulgated regulations intended to ensure that the supply
of information to investors would be adequate.1 2
Superimposed upon the disclosure-oriented federal law is a
growing body of state law which purports to regulate tender of5. For an excellent discussion of target management's various defenses, see Block &
Miller, The Responsibilitiesand Obligations of Corporate Directorsin Takeover Contests,
11 Sec. Reg. L.J. 44 (1983). Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Oier, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (incumbent management should not interfere in any way with the takeover process).
6. "The single most effective weapon a target company may utilize to defeat a tender
offer is delay." Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 9 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
7. Id. "A tender offer ... helps to maintain accountability of corporate management
to itsshareholders. Through this device . . . shareholders are given a chance to remove
inefficient or sluggish management from office." Id. at 8.
8. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1217 (D.N.J. 1981).
9. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
10. For actions that target management might take, possible justifications for such
actions, and the insulating effect of the "business judgment rule," see Reuben & Elden, How
to Be a Target Company, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 423 (1978). See also supra note 5. For
defensive measures before a hostile offer materializes, see, Comment, Corporate Takeover
Battles, supra note 3, at 1683.
11. Retention of control is an impermissible motive because it introduces a conflict of
interest between target management and shareholders. See Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511
F. Supp. 294, 303 (D. Del. 1981); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp.
706 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
12. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF EQUITY OWNERSHIP
AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1967). Some
congressmen were also concerned about "looting" of target corporations by "raiders." Id. at
46 (statement of Sen. Kuchel); 111 CONG. REc. 28, 257-58 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams). See also Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (after purchasing
controlling interest in the target, the offeror liquidated the company's assets, taking advantage of the greatly appreciated value of the target's inventory).
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fers.'5 These state laws, however, are generally parochial in nature,
their purpose being to protect local business and industry.1 4 The
trend in modern practice is toward the wholesale invalidation of
state tender offer statutes on constitutional grounds. Initially, an
overview of the applicable federal legislation is necessary in order
to fully appreciate the nature of the constitutional conflicts
involved.
II.

FEDERAL TENDER OFFER LAWS

The definition is elusive, changing with the nature of the transaction involved.15 At the federal level, Congress has manifested its
intent to use a flexible definition, leaving the Securities Exchange
Commission (S.E.C.) and the federal judiciary to decide the issue
on a case by case basis. 6 Conversely, state tender offer regulation
17
typically contains more objective definitions.
In 1979, the S.E.C. proposed a more objective, two-tiered definition of "tender offer" which would classify as tender offers any offers for securities made during any 45 day period to more than 10
persons for more than 5% of the class of securities, or any widely
publicized, non-negotiable offers which provided for a certain premium over market price. 8 Subsequently, the S.E.C. asked Con13. Thirty-three states currently have takeover statutes on the books: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia and Wisconsin. The legislatures of Florida, Illinois and Utah enacted but later repealed their takeover
regulation. For a thorough summary of the remaining effective takeover statute provisions,
see 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREzEouTs § 504 (1984).
14. See Gould & Jacobs, The PracticalEffects of State Tender Offer Legislation, 23
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 399, 403-07 (1978). Not only are local industrialists the prime lobbyists
for state tender offer legislation, but state statutes have even been promulgated to ward off
the impending takeover of a specific local concern. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1707.041 (Page 1976) (enacted in response to the attempted takeover of B.F. Goodrich & Co.
by Northwest Industries). See generally Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58
MARQ. L. REV. 687 (1975).
15. See Symposium, The Elusive Definition of Tender Offer, 7 J. CORP. L. 503 (1982);
Comment, The Developing Meaning of Tender Offer, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1973).
16. See T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURIES REGULATION § 11.13 (1985).
17. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 203(c)(2) (1983); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 73
(Purdon Supp. 1985) (defining "takeover offer").
18. The proposed definition provided:
(1) The term "tender offer" includes a request or invitation for tenders "and means
one or more offers to purchase or solicitations of offers to sell securities of a single
class, whether or not all or any portion of the securities sought are purchased which
(i) during any 45 day period are directed to more than 10 persons and seek the acqui-
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gress to legislatively define tender offer as the acquisition of ten
percent or more of a company's voting securities.1 9 This was because the S.E.C. recognized that many tender offers were structured so as to evade the provisions of the Williams Act. 20 The
S.E.C.'s position has been that the term "tender offer" covers more
than takeover attempts using public solicitation, and may even include privately negotiated or open market purchases.2 1
Eight indicia of tender offers presently guide the S.E.C. in its
rulings: (1) whether there has been widespread solicitation; (2) of
public shareholders; (3) regarding a limited duration, non-negotiable offer; (4) for a substantial portion of the issuer's securities; (5)
at a premium over current market price; (6) contingent upon the
tender of a minimum number of shares; (7) whether the offerees
are pressured to sell their stock; and, (8) whether there have been
public announcements of a purchasing program either preceding or
accompanying a rapid accumulation of stock.22 These factors, of
course, are not engraved in stone. The Williams Act "was not intended to subject any. . . extensive market acquisition program to
'2 3
immediate characterization as a tender offer."
The most important of these factors has generally been whether
sition of more than 5% of the class of securities, except that offers by a broker (and
its customer) or by a dealer made on a national securities exchange at the then current market or made in the over-the-counter market at the then current market shall
be excluded if in connection with such offers neither the person making the offers nor
such broker or dealer solicits or arranges for the solicitation of any order to sell such
securities and such broker or dealer performs only the customary functions of a broker or dealer and receives no more than the broker's usual and customary commission
or the dealer's usual and customary mark-up; or
(ii) are not otherwise a tender offer under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section, but
which (A) are disseminated in a wide-spread manner, (B) provide for a price which
represents a premium in excess of the greater of 5% of or $2 above the current market price and (C) do not provide for a meaningful opportunity to negotiate the price
and terms.
Proposed Rule 14d-l(b)(1), 3 FED.SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 24,281A (Nov. 29, 1979). See Sec.
Exch. Act Release No. 34-16385 (Nov. 29, 1979).
19. This occurred three months after the S.E.C. proposed its two-tiered definition of
"tender offer." T. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 348 n.11. According to the author, Congress has
not yet responded. Id.
20. Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 34-16385 (Nov. 29, 1979).
21. T. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 350.
22. These factors have evolved over a period of time and are discussed in Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
23. Ludlow Corp. v. Tyco Laboratories, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 62, 69 (D. Mass. 1981). For
similar results under state takeover statutes, see Condec Corp. v. Farley, 578 F. Supp. 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (involving the New York Takeover Disclosure Act); Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 276 S.E.2d 422 (1981).
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the transactions are accompanied by high-pressure tactics.2 4 Further, the federal courts have been more inclined to hold that a
tender offer has occurred when a publicly announced intention to
purchase a large block of stock is followed by a rapid acquisition
thereof.2 5 If none of the S.E.C.'s eight factors are present, the
courts have been less inclined to hold that a tender offer has occurred and may characterize the purchasing scheme as merely "a
particularly aggressive open market [or privately negotiated] stock

buying program. "26
The reason for the focus on the amount of pressure brought to
bear in the stock purchase program is that, as far as privately negotiated purchases are concerned, any purchase pressure that interferes with a shareholder's "unhurried investment decision" and
the "fair treatment of . . . investors" defeats the protections afforded by the Williams Act and will likely be considered a tender
offer. 27 Once an offer is identified as a tender offer, the filing 2 8 antifraud29 and disclosure 0 provisions of the Williams Act apply.
The Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act
of 19341 were enacted to protect investors from having to make an
uninformed decision whether to tender their stocks when faced
with a cash tender offer.32 Prior to the Act's passage in 1968, a cash
tender offeror was not required to disclose its identity or its plans.
Thus, it was the purpose of the Act to "correct the current gap
[the disclosure requirements] in our [federal] securities laws."3 3
Underlying the Williams Act was a congressional determination
that the investing public should be protected by a "market ap24. Ludlow Corp., 529 F. Supp. at 69.
25. See S-G Sec. Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978) (twentyeight percent of target company's stock purchased). Cf. Gulf & Western Indus. Inc. v. Great
Am. At. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (no
tender offer if the five percent threshold is not reached); Water & Wall Ass'n., Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc. [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. S.c. L. REP. (CCH) 93,943 (D.N.J.
1973) (no tender offer when threshold is reached, but no attempt to exercise voting control
is made); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (purchase
of twenty-five percent of an issuer's stock in two days was held not to be a tender offer
because only one of the S.E.C.'s eight factors was present).
26. Ludlow Corp., 529 F. Supp. at 62.
27. Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (holding that a
tender offer had occurred).
28. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
29. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
30. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(f), 15 U.S.C § 78n(f) (1982).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1982).
32. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, supra note 12.
33. Id. at 4.
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proach" that generates a "free flow of information from both sides,
so that knowledgeable shareholders can make an unfettered and
knowledgeable choice whether to relinquish their shares for a cash
premium." 3 Further, Congress was aware of and concerned about
the phenomenon of the corporate raider. 5 Yet Congress determined that such onerous burdens should not be placed on tender
offers as would render them unavailable. s Recognizing that takeover bids "serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management, 's7 Congress felt it necessary
to avoid favoring either incumbent management or takeover
38
bidders.
Neutrality in tender offer regulation was the legislative objective.
As Senator Williams stated at the time: "We have taken extreme
care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in
34. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1980). As the Fifth Circuit
has noted: "Under this approach, federal regulation functions to get information to the investor by allowing both the offeror and the incumbent managers of a target company to
present fully their arguments and then to let the investor decide for himself." Great United
Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue grounds sub nom.
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
35. As Senator Kuchel, co-sponsor of the legislation, stated:
Today there are those in our financial community who seek to reduce our proudest
businesses into nothing but corporate shells. They seize control of the corporation
with unknown sources, sell or trade away the best assets, and later split up the remains among themselves. The tragedy of such collusion is that the corporation can be
financially raped without management or shareholders having any knowledge of the
acquisitions. . . . The corporate raider may thus act under a cloak of secrecy while
obtaining the shares needed to put him on the road to a successful capture of the
company.
113 CONG. REc. 857-59 (1967). Senator Kuchel thus emphasized that tender offerors were
not the intended beneficiaries. This quote was germane to the holding in Piper v. ChrisCraft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), which denied shareholder status with its affiliated protections to a tender offeror and further denied it a private cause of action for damages when
the tender offer was defeated. See supra note 2.
The looting cases have often involved investment companies. See e.g., Insuranshares
Corp. of Del. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Gerdes v. Reynolds,
28 N.Y.S. 2d 622 (1941). The Federal Investment Co. Act of 1940 requires honest and unbiased management of such companies that are subject to the Act; section 16(a), 15 U.S.C. §
80a-10 (1982).
36. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1217 (D.N.J. 1981).
37. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, at 3 (1967). See also supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
38. See Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982). The
court interpreted congressional intent as seeking to protect the investor not only by furnishing him with the necessary information but also by withholding from management or the
bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice. See
MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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favor of the person making the takeover bids. [This legislation] is
designed solely to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of
investors. '3 9 Thus, Congress expressly denied any desire to provide
management with a weapon to discourage takeover bids.40 Since,
for example, any delay favors incumbent management, the federal
government has refused to countenance any regulations that would
serve to unduly delay the offer.4 1 The prevailing view, succinctly
summarized by the Fifth Circuit in Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell,4s is that investors have the right to hear a fair presentation of the offeror's proposal, and that such a right can only be
protected by avoiding regulation that disadvantages an offeror in
favor of target management.43 Any regulation of tender offers must
be even-handed in its application and effect in order to be
legitimate.
The most important provisions of the Williams Act have been
39. 113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
40. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). "Congress intended to do
no more than give incumbent management an opportunity to express and explain its position." Id.
41. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. Congress and courts alike have recognized delay as target management's most potent weapon. See Kennecott Corp., 507 F. Supp.
at 1218. Delay is viewed as frustrating the purposes of the Williams Act in three ways:
(i) delay of the commencement of a tender offer denies investors the critical information about both the offer and the offeror that is essential to making the kind of informed choice contemplated by the "market approach"; (ii) delay is inevitably used
by the incumbent management of the target, through various defensive tactics, to
deprive shareholders of the opportunity to choose at all. . . and (iii) delay harms an
offeror whose offer may be frustrated 'not through adverse action of the shareholders,
as Congress contemplates, but through barriers erected by target management.'
Id., citing Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d at 188-89. See also Sheffield v. Consolidated
Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 276 S.E.2d 422 (1981) (protect public investor by providing otherwise unobtainable information); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981)
(protect target investors by allowing both offeror and target management to present their
respective arguments); Gunter v. Ago Intern B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (Williams Act imposes neutrality among the parties to a tender offer by requiring full and fair
disclosure for the investors' benefit while providing offeror and target management the
chance to fairly present their cases); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (Congress
intended to protect investors, but major aspect of this protection was to avoid favoring either the offeror or the target management).
42. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
43. Id. The corollary, of course, is evenhanded regulation. Kennecott Corp., 597 F.
Supp. at 1216. Cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), in which Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court, observed that while "Congress was indeed committed to a
policy of neutrality in contests for control,. . . its policy of evenhandedness does not go ...
to the purpose of the legislation [but is] one characteristic of legislation directed toward a
different purpose-the protection of investors." Id. at 29.
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codified in sections 13(d)"" (essentially a disclosure provision keyed
to neutrality 5 and the preservation of investor autonomy '), and
14(d) 47 (also a disclosure provision). The primary difference between the two sections is that the former calls for disclosure after
acquisition of beneficial ownership to inform the shareholders of
the potential effects of the acquisition on the investment, while the
latter calls for pre-acquisition disclosure to inform shareholders of
such effects.48
The Schedule 13D,49 as required by Section 13(d), must disclose
the purchaser's identity and background, amount and source of
funds for the purchase, extent of purchaser's holdings in the issuer,
whether the purchase is effectuated for gaining control of the corporation and whether the purchaser plans to liquidate, merge, or
make any other major changes in the target corporation's business
50
or structure.

Regulation 14D 51 sets forth the S.E.C.'s filing and disclosure re44. See Rule 13d-1 which provides criteria triggering application of § 13. The rule
requires:
(a) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of
any equity security of a class which is specified in paragraph (d), is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 percent of such class shall, within ten days
after such acquisition, send to the issuer of the security . . . and to each exchange
where the security is traded . . . a statement containing the information required by
Schedule 13D.
15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(d) (1982). Schedule 13D is found at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1984).
45. The purpose of requiring any person acquiring more than five percent of any class
of registered securities of a corporation to send to the issuer and to file with the S.E.C a
disclosure of certain information is not to protect incumbent management or to discourage
takeover bids, but to assure a fair fight between target management and tender offerors,
Indiana Nat'l. Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1983); to alert the marketplace to every
rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities, Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d
1299 (9th Cir. 1982); and to protect the individual investor from making uninformed decisions in response to tender offers, S.E.C. v. World Wide Corn Inv. Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724
(N.D. Ga. 1983); Chock Full O'Nuts Corp. v. Finkelstein, 548 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Jewel Co., Inc. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
46. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In Chiarella the court indicated that the provisions of § 13(d),
which place a five percent limitation on the amount of target stock that may be purchased
by a would-be tender offeror prior to the offer, were not intended to interfere with an offeror's exercise of its economic judgment. Rather, the five percent limitation was intended to
prevent the stampede effect that tender offer publicity has on shareholders. Id.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982). See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
48. Nicholson File Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 341 F. Supp. 508 (D.R.I. 1972), aff'd, 482
F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
49. See supra note 44.
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1984).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
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quirements under Section 14(d). Rule 14d-1 51 gives a basic definition of tender offer and incorporates by reference all general definitions applicable under other provisions of the Exchange Act.
Rule 14d-2 details how a tender offer is commenced.53 Section
14(d) requires the filing of Schedule 14D," which contains the
same basic information as Schedule 13D plus additional information regarding any past negotiations or transactions with the target
company, and any financial information about the offeror if such
information is material to the offer.5 5 The Supreme Court has indicated that material information is that which a reasonable shareholder would likely consider important in deciding how to vote."
The Williams Act also provides certain substantive protections
to tendering shareholders during the course of the offer. Shareholders must be allowed to withdraw their tendered shares during
the first seven days following publication of the offer, or after sixty
days if the offeror has not already purchased them.57 In addition, if
the offer is for less than 100% of the target's shares, all shares
tendered during the first ten days must be taken pro rata," and
any subsequent increase in the offered price must also be paid to
those shareholders who have already tendered their stock."
The broadest reaching provisions of the Exchange Act concerning tender offers are found in Section 14(e), 60 which prohibit mate52. 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-1 (1984).
53. A tender offer begins at 12:01 a.m. on the earliest date of the following events: (1)
first publication of the longform pursuant to Rule 14d-4(a)(1); (2) first publication of a summary advertisement pursuant to Rule 14d-4(a)(2); or (3) first public announcement of the
tender offer unless withdrawn within five days or the "bidder" complies with the filing and
disclosure requirements of Rules 14d-3(a), 14d-6 and 14d-4 which all require public dissemination. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1984).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1984).
55. The offer must disclose all material facts under § 14(d) of the Williams Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982). Other facts which must be disclosed include whether the person
filing has been convicted of criminal activity or has been a party to past S.E.C. proceedings,
and whether any steps are required to be taken for any necessary administrative approval,
as well as the applicability of antitrust laws margin requirements of 15 U.S.C § 78(g) (1982)
and any pending legal proceedings.
56. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1978).
57. Williams Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
58. Id. at § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6).
59. Id. at § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7).
60. Section 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in
any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:867

rial misstatements, omissions and fraudulent practices without regard to whether the target company is subject to the Exchange
Act's reporting requirements."' In conjunction with this section,
the S.E.C. promulgated Regulation E,6 2 which sets forth acts and
practices violative of Section 14(e) and applies to all tender offers.
Covered are duration, 3 modification,64 payment of consideration
offered, 65 and return of tendered securities upon withdrawal or termination of the offer. 6 The S.E.C. has proposed that it be unlawful for a tender offeror not to offer the highest consideration to all
shareholders solicited pursuant to the same tender offer 7 (to prevent abusive two-tiered tender offers), es The Commission has also
proposed that it be unlawful for any participant in a tender offer
to purchase securities subject to the tender offer (with an exception for securities purchased under a qualified employee benefit
plan) 69
One of the most controversial issues involving tender offers concerns the proper role of management's response. Responses to
tender offers are governed by Rule 14e-2, 1 ° and insider trading is
in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
15 U.S.C. §78n(e) (1982).
61. All the other provisions of the Williams Act are limited to securities of issuers
subject to the registration requirements of section 12. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982). Section 12
requires any corporation with assets of $1,000,000 or more and over 500 shareholders, as
well as corporations whose securities are traded on a national exchange, to register with the

S.E.C.
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e (1984).
63. Rule 14e-1 requires that a tender offer be held open for at least twenty business
days from the date of first publication of the offer, unless the tender offer is by the issuer
and is not made in anticipation of, or in response to, another person's takeover attempt. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1984). If the length of the offer is extended, notice of such extension
must be made by press release or other public announcement. Id. at § 240.14e-1(d).
64. A tender offeror may not increase the offer's terms, type of consideration, or
dealer's soliciting fee without keeping the offer open for at least ten business days from the
publication of the notice of such increase. This does not apply to tender offers by the issuer
of securities which are not made in anticipation of or response to another person's tender
offer for securities of the same class. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(b) (1984).
65. Failure to do so is prohibited by 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(c) (1984).
66. Failure to do so is prohibited by 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(c) (1984).
67. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 24,298 (1979). This rule has not
been adopted but is known as proposed rule 14e-4. Id.
68. In a two-tiered tender offer, only those shareholders tendering control shares pursuant to the offer receive a premium price. Late tendering shareholders receive a lower consideration. See also infra note 79 and accompanying text.
69. Proposed rule 14e-5. See supra note 67. This rule would parallel the antitrust provisions currently found in rule 10b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10d-13 (1984).
70. After a tender offer is made, a target company has ten business days from the date
of first publication of the offer during which it must make (1) a recommendation of the
acceptance or rejection, (2) an expression of no opinion or of neutrality toward the offer, or
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prohibited by Rule 14e-3, as is trading with inside information.71
The issue of target management's response is complicated by the
frequent eventuality of incumbent management's replacement following the takeover. Tender offers often contain agreements on
this issue, known as control transfers. These transfers can create
problems under state fiduciary as well as other laws invalidating
control premiums.7 The Williams Act thus imposes disclosure requirements on control transfers under Section 14(f) of the Exchange Act.73 The purpose of this section is to keep shareholders
informed of changes in management control effected without a
shareholder vote, and to provide the shareholders with all such
74
material information.
Two rules under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 7 5 also affect
conduct during a tender offer. Rule 10b-13 prohibits the purchase
of target securities by a tender offeror, other than through the
tender offer, during the period the offer is open. 76 Rule 10b-4 prohibits the tendering or guaranteeing of securities by a person not
owning those securities." Moreover, market professionals may not
sell on the open market that portion of their holdings in the target
which they estimate will not be accepted by the tender offeror. s
Finally, the S.E.C. has announced plans to curtail suspected unfairness and abuses arising from two-tiered tender offers, but these
proposals have not been enacted into law.'
(3) an announcement that it is unable to take a position respecting the offer. 17 C.FR §
240.14e-2 (1984).
71. Id. § 240.14e-3(b). However, if the transaction arose out of an independent investment decision, there is no violation.
72. See H. HENNi& J. Ai.ExANDR. LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 241 (3d ed. 1983). "In
selling control, controlling shareholders owe to the corporation duties of due care and fiduciary duties, being liable for any resulting damage to the corporation and any profits realized
by them for control in connection with the sale of their controlling shares.
...
Id. at 656.
73. Rule 14f-1, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1982). Where a tender offer for securities of a reporting company contains agreements concerning a,transfer of control (e.g., replacement of
directors) through means other than by a formal vote at a stockholders' meeting, full disclosure is required. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14f-1 (1984).
74. See T. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 364.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1984). See generally Lowenfels, Rule 10b-13, Rule 10b-6
and Purchases of Target Company Shares During an Exchange Offer, 69 COLUr. L. Rzv.
392 (1969).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1984). This practice is known as "short tendering." Cf. 15
U.S.C. § 78j(a) (1982); 17 C.F.R § 240.10a-1, 10a-2 (1984) (less stringent rules for short sales
in general).
78. This "hedged tendering" has been prohibited recently. See 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 575-76 (March 30, 1984) (amending rule 10b-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1984)).
79. Sec. Ezch. Act Release No. 34-21079 (June 21, 1984). In the two-tiered or "front
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III. STATE TENDER OFFER LAWS

Because the Williams Act is silent regarding substantive defensive measures, states retain the authority to regulate relations between shareholders and management under Section 28(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.0 Most state tender offer statutes

purport to be enacted to decrease pressure on shareholders to
tender hastily, thus allowing a more reasoned and informed evaluation of tender proposals."1 To the contrary, however, investor protection was not the motivating factor behind most state regulation.
Rather, it was usually the protection of incumbent management of
local companies subject to takeover that provided the impetus.
Such regulations acted as impediments to takeovers, and generally
hindered or slowed the process.8 2 If the state regulation becomes
overly restrictive, however, such that it conflicts with the basic policy of the Williams Act, it may be held to be an invalid and unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce 8 or to be preempted by
the supremacy clause."4
end loaded" tender offer, the shareholders selling the controlling shares receive more for
their stock than do the remaining shareholders who are bought out in a subsequent merger.
Compare the position of the S.E.C. espoused in this release with that taken by the court in
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982), in which it was
held that section 14(e) was exclusively a disclosure provision and that Congress had not
given the federal courts authority to scrutinize the substantive fairness of a tender offer
once adequate disclosure had been made. 547 F. Supp. at 528.
On July 8, 1983, the S.E.C. Tender Offer Advisory Committee presented its recommendations to the S.E.C. See 1 D.J. BLOCK & H.L. Prrr, HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
559 (Practicing Law Institute 1985). The Committee felt that the current scheme gave rise
to four problems: (1) disincentives to undertaking an exchange offer (exchange of securities
of target for securities of acquirer); (2) use of open market purchases and other methods to
acquire control of issuers that deny shareholders the opportunity to share in the control
premium; (3) the potentially coercive effects that two-tiered or partial tender offers have on
target shareholders; and, (4) the need to afford an equal opportunity for all target shareholders to participate in an offer. Id. at 565. See also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying
text.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) states: "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." Id. This is essentially a savings clause
which explicitly legitimizes concomitant state regulations. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292 n.3 (2d ed. 1983).
81. E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 218-19 (1977).
82. T. HAZEN, supra note 16, § 11.21 at 386.
83. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.3. See infra note 108. See also Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
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Nearly all state statutes apply to tender offers for corporations
incorporated under the laws of the state and most apply to offers
for corporations that have substantial assets and/or a principal
place of business within the state. a5 Where the statute establishes
jurisdiction over the target,8 6 an offeror is subject to the regulating
state's law in its transactions with all shareholders living in that
state and elsewhere. 87 This prevents the offeror from avoiding a
state's requirements by excluding its residents from the offer.
The state acts typically impose disclosure and substantive requirements on the offeror. Some jurisdictions require the same disclosure as that provided under the Williams Act.88 Several, such as
Pennsylvania, 8 New York9" and Ohio 9 ' require additional disclosure. Disclosures must be filed anywhere from ten days9" to sixty
days 93 before the offer can become effective. A twenty day requirement is the most common. 4 The imposition of additional filing requirements by various state acts that require more detailed disclosures than under the Williams Act is generally upheld by the
courts because such provisions are deemed to supplement, rather
than conflict with the federal scheme.9
The state agency which regulates securities is usually empowered
to enforce the disclosure provisions and can order a hearing on its
85. For a comprehensive review of all the currently effective state provisions that regulate tender offers, see 1 LIPTON & STEINHERGER, supra note 13, at § 504.
86. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONROL 234-46 (1973);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1601(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978) (unincorporated or principal place of
business and substantial assets in state); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (1984) (unincorporated in state).
87. See generally E. ARArow & H. EINHORN, supra note 86 at 234; IDAHO CODE § 301506(1) (1980) (requiring that tender offer to regulating state's resident shareholders be
made on same terms as offer to out-of-state shareholders).
88. MD. CoRPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-902(b)(8) (1985).
89. 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 75 (Purdon Supp. 1984) (requiring disclosure by offeror
of its capital structure, any pending legal or administrative proceedings, and its financial
statements for the current and prior three years).
90. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1603(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
91. OHIO REV. ConE ANN. § 1707.041B(3) (Page 1985).
92. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11.51.5-104(1) (Supp. 1976) (repealed Supp. 1985).
93. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-3(f) (1976).
94. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1602 (McKinney Supp. 1984); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
1707.041(B)(1) (Page 1985); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 74(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984).
95. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). See also 70 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 75(4) (Purdon Supp. 1984) (requiring disclosure of the probable effect of
the takeover on labor relations); OHIO REV. CobE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(3)(d) (1985) (requiring
disclosure of planned changes in employment policies, management personnel or corporate
structure).
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own motion, or, as often happens, at the request of the target company.9 6 Most states limit the hearings to whether there has been a
full and fair disclosure by the offeror.9 Where many state acts go
awry is in exceeding the disclosure policy of the Williams Act.
These acts give the state agency the ability to pass not just upon
the adequacy of disclosure, but also upon the substantive merits or
fairness of the offer. e8
The substantive provisions of the state statutes cover minimum
and maximum offering periods, 99 withdrawal rights of tendering
shareholders, 00 and the period during which an offeror must accept all tendered shares on a pro rata basis. 101 These, too, can pose
problems, but perhaps the greatest conflict between state and federal tender offer legislation has arisen in the context of state-imposed waiting periods between the filing of the tender offer and its
effective date. Statutory provisions requiring such a pre-commencement waiting period were preempted in 1979 by the S.E.C.'s
promulgation of Rule 14d-2(b). Thus, any state statutes purporting
to delay the commencement of an offer past the date of filing or
first publication are invalid.
As with the Williams Act, a key issue in state takeover legislation is the extent to which the requirements of such statutes apply
to acquisitions falling outside the conventional definition of tender
offers. 021 Various state statutes define a tender offer as consisting
96. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-347(e) (West Supp. 1977)(repealed 1979); 70 PA CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 74(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984). For a review of the procedure for initiating a hearing under the various state statutes, see LirON & STEINBERGER, supra note 13, at 5-35.
97. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 552.05(5) (West Special Pamphlet 1984). For a review of standards under the state legislation, see LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 13, at 5-35.
98. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981); New Jersey Takeover Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-4(a) (West Supp. 1985) (defeating the purpose of the Williams Act by substituting the opinion of a Bureau Chief for the shareholders' informed judgment regarding an offer). Cf. North Star Int'l. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n., 720 F.2d 578 (9th
Cir. 1983) (Securities Act of 1933 does not preempt Arizona blue sky law provisions for
merit review of interstate securities offering).
99. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (1983) (twenty day minimum, no maximum); VA.
CODE § 13.1-530(a) (Supp 1979) (twenty-one day minimum and thirty-five day maximum)
(repealed 1979) (Supp. 1984).
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3) (1983) (withdrawal of shares allowed for first
twenty days of offer or for ten days after amendment of offer); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-8
(Burns 1984).
101. IDAHO CODE § 30-1506(3) (Supp. 1978) (proration required during first ten days of
offer); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1 - 6.5 (Burns 1984) (proration required during entire offer).
Cf. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 417E-2(3) (1976) (any offer must be for 100% of the target's outstanding shares, therefore, no pro-rata purchase provision is necessary).
102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984). This section states in pertinent part:
A public announcement by a bidder through a press-release, newspaper advertise-
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of one or more of the following: (1) an offer; (2) an offer to acquire
or an acquisition pursuant to a tender offer, or request or invitation for tenders; (3) an offer to purchase or invitation to tender for
purchase; (4) purchases made pursuant to a cash tender offer; and
(5) a purchase program involving either open-market or privately
negotiated purchases, or both.1" 3 As a result, some state statutes
are applicable to open-market or privately negotiated purchases
from selected shareholders 0 while others are not;' ° a particular
transaction may be classified as a tender offer in one state and not
in another.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE TENDER OFFER
STATUTES

Challenges to state tender offer legislation are frequently based
on the supremacy 06 and commerce' 0 7 clauses of the Constitution.
Usually, supremacy clause analysis focuses on conflicts between
state and federal regulation. Preemption under the supremacy
clause is largely a matter of congressional intent. 10 8 State laws are
ment or public statement which includes the information in paragraph (c) of this
section with respect to a tender offer in which the consideration consists solely of
cash and/or securities exempt from registration under section 3 of the Securities Act
of 1933 shall be deemed to constitute the commencement of a tender offer ....
Id.

103.

LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 13, at 5-35.
104. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
105. See Strode v. Esmark, Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,538 (Ky. 1980), aff'd, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,238 (Ky. Ct.
App. April 3, 1981) (rapid open market and privately negotiated transactions are "takeover
bids" under Kentucky law).
106. See Ludlow Corp. v. Tyco Labs., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 62 (D. Mass. 1981) (open
market and privately negotiated purchases are not tender offer within meaning of the Williams Act); Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 96,403, at p. 93,430 (D.D.C. 1978) (open market and privately negotiated
purchases are exempt from Virginia statute because they are "isolated offers").
See also In re EZ Painter Corp. & Newell Cos. Inc., BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,063, at
p. 67,316 (Wis. Comm'r Sec. 1973), wherein the court noted that there are six criteria to be
considered in characterizing purchases as a tender offer. As the court stated, these include:
(1) the number of persons approached; (2) the period of time in which purchases occur; (3)
the characteristics of the shareholders approached; (4) the nature of contacts made with the
shareholders; (5) the terms and specificity of the proposals; and, (6) whether the application
of the state takeover statute's substantive protections of offerees is applicable.
107. "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States shall be the Supreme Law
of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. To the extent that Congress has exercised its legislative power, a state is precluded from enacting inconsistent legislation. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
108. "The Congress shall have the power. . . [tjo regulate commerce ..
among the
several states." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3. State legislation will be upheld only if its regula-
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preempted when federal legislation expressly provides'0 9 or when
the state regulation directly conflicts with the federal enactments. 11 0 Such conflict is particularly apparent where state statutes favor local incumbent management by delaying offers, while
federal policy, in contrast, requires even-handed regulation."'
Because corporate regulation is not traditionally a federal concern 1 2 and because the Williams Act provides minimum standards
of disclosure rather than detailing a comprehensive regulatory
scheme, 113 it cannot be inferred that Congress intended to preempt
all state regulation. This was the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries, Inc.." 4 The Piper
Court found the sole purpose of the Williams Act to be protection
115
of investors confronted with a tender offer.
Although the Williams Act does not expressly preclude the
states from regulating tender offers, preemption may still be implied by an overriding federal interest in the subject,"' or when
federal regulation of an area is so pervasive as to imply that Congress intended to completely "occupy the field,.""' or when state
regulation prevents the fulfillment of federal regulatory objectives." 8 Whether or not state tender offer statutes are preempted
tion is even-handed, advances a legitimate local public interest, has only an incidental effect
on interstate commerce, and the burdens imposed on interstate commerce do not outweigh
local benefits. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
109. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1948).
110. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (concurrent state regulation prohibited by the Federal Warehouse Act).
111. See, e.g., Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)
("[Flederal exclusion of state law is inescapable . . . where compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility ... ") Id. at 142-43.
112. See Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1976); Langevoort, State Tender Offer
Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 246-54
(1977).
113. However, because of the federal securities legislation, a body of federal corporate
law has been emerging. See generally W. CAREY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS

13-14 (5th ed. 1980).

114. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court held that the unsuccessful tender offeror had no
implied cause of action for damages under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C § 78(e) (1982), which prohibits fraud in connection with tender offers. The offeror was
not a member of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted.
115. 430 U.S. at 3.
116. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (state anti-communist legislation
preempted by congressional enactment of anti-government overthrow measures and internal
security laws).
117. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (local
anti-noise ordinance preempted by federal regulations concerning aircraft and airports).
118. Id.
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by the Williams Act "depends upon a determination [of] whether
they merely supplement or are inconsistent with the purposes of
the federal enactment."'"" Such a determination necessarily involves a balancing of state and federal objectives. 2 0
Of course, even when a state law is not preempted by federal
legislation under the supremacy clause, it is still open to constitutional challenge if it imposes excessive burdens upon interstate
commerce. State tender offer statutes risk conflict with the commerce clause primarily because of the extraterritorial coverage that
enables the state to control transactions between nonresident offerors and nonresident shareholders.'' The offer might not have
sufficient contacts with the regulating state to justify the state's
exercise of jurisdiction. 2 2 The problem is that the legitimate state
interest in extraterritorial coverage is difficult to identify, since a
state can have no interest in protecting out-of-state residents or in
regulating out-of-state tender offers. 2s One commentator has suggested that such coverage is probably "intended to insulate local
target companies from takeovers, thereby preventing the possible
liquidation or relocation of corporate assets and the consequent
loss of local revenue and employment.' 12 4 This protection of local
15
commerce has been declared to be an illegitimate state interest.
The test by which commerce clause analysis proceeds is one balancing the impact of the statute on interstate commerce against
the legitimate state interests being served by the law. 2 A state
statute will generally be struck down under this analysis if it substantially impedes the free flow of interstate commerce or if it af119. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (D.N.J. 1981). "However, a
determination that the state act supplements the federal act does not necessarily require a
conclusion that such act does not frustrate the federal act." Id.
120. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941).
121. This sets state tender offer statutes on a separate ground than state blue sky laws
that are wholly within the competency of states "to protect the public against the imposition of unsubstantial schemes and the securities based upon them." Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) (upholding Ohio blue-sky law against commerce clause challenge because such laws regulate wholly intrastate transactions).
122. See E. ARA 4ow, supra note 81, at 231-32.
123. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935). "New York has no power
to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that state for
milk acquired there." Id.
124. See Note, Securities Law and the Constitution:State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 528 (1979).
125. See Boston Stock Exch. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (citing Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)).
126. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
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fects an area of commerce requiring national uniformity.1 27
Courts have preferred to apply commerce clause analysis to each
separate provision of a statute, rather than to the statute as a
whole, so as to avoid the wholesale invalidation of entire statutes. 128 If only burdensome provisions are eliminated, the state
statute could continue to protect investors. This can be done if "it
appears both that, standing alone, legal effect can be given to [a
provision] and that the legislature intended the provision to stand
'2 9
in case others included in the act and held bad should fall.' 1
Even if extraterritorial coverage is justifiable, the offeror is still significantly burdened by conflicts between regulations of the several
states that may assert jurisdiction over an offer.'3 0
Decided in 1978, Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell1 was
the first case in which a federal court ruled on the constitutionality
of a state tender offer statute. In that case, the Fifth Circuit held
that the Idaho act at issue was both preempted by the Williams
Act and repugnant to the Constitution.' 2 The Fifth Circuit decision in Great Western led to the subsequent invalidation of several
state statutes.'3 3 Other cases recognized the possibility of success
of such a claim based on Great Western without ruling on the merits of the constitutional challenge."3
127. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
128. Note, supra note 124, at 527.
129. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924). This task may be simplified where
severability clauses are included in the statute. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-18 (West
Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1613 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
130. See, e.g., HAWAI REV. STAT. § 417E.2(1) (1976) (offer must remain open for no
more than thirty-five days). Cf. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110c § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp.
1978) (minimum of fifteen days, no maximum). Such conflict makes it doubtful that extraterritorial provisions could survive commerce clause analysis.
131. 577 F.2d 125C- (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
132. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the Williams Act and preemption of state statutes, see generally, Moore, Preemption and the Constitutionality of State Tender Offer
Legislation, 54 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 725 (1979).
133. Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98.247 (E.D. La. 1979) (Louisiana statute invalidated by the Fifth Circuit); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1
(S.D. Ind. 1978), application for stay pending appeal denied (7th Cir. Nov. 13, 1978) (Delaware and Illinois statutes); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, No. 79-C-200 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 1979), aff'd
sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (permanent injunction against Illinois
statute); Kelly v. Beta-X Corp., No. 79-23317-c2 (Mich. Cir. July 11, 1979), afJ'd, No. 46077
(Mich. App. Oct. 23, 1980), aff'd, 302 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. 1981) (holding that the pre-offer
filing and hearing requirements of Michigan Takeover Offers Act was incompatible with the
"market approach" adopted by Congress although the anti-fraud provision was not
unconstitutional).
134. S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978) (court refused
to issue a preliminary injunction against offeror's alleged violation of Massachusetts takeover law because there was no likelihood of success on the merits); Occidental Petroleum
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One year later, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit decision on venue grounds, but declined to address the question of
the constitutionality of state takeover laws. 135 Following this reversal, a split of opinion developed, some courts continuing to follow
the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit to invalidate state statutes or
grant preliminary injunctions against their enforcement,"' others
simply refusing to invalidate state statutes,13 7 and some refusing to
decide their constitutionality. 138 It was amidst this prevailing judicial uncertainty that the S.E.C. promulgated Rule 14d-2(b), which
was designed to invalidate many state statutory provisions. 39 As
the Commission noted at the time:
[B]y deeming commencement to occur on the date of the publication or
filing required by these [state] statutes, the minimum periods, best price,
and withdrawal and pro rata rights provided under these [state] statutes
could not function since they are usually predicated on the effective date of
the tender offer which cannot occur until after the conclusion of the waiting
period and hearing process.'

On October 17, 1980, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
an Illinois takeover statute unconstitutional in MITE Corp. v.
Dixon.'4 1 The court avoided the issue of congressional preemption,
finding instead that the state law frustrated the Williams Act's
Corp. v. Hurd, C-3-78-1100 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (offeror alleged Ohio statute was an effective

obstacle to tender offers for Ohio companies in violation of the supremacy, due process and
commerce clauses of the Constitution.
135. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
136. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Lassiter, No. 79-2845 (E.D. La. July 20, 1979) (preliminary injunction against enforcement of Louisiana statute by target company and state officials); TRE Corp. v. Dixon, 79 C 5284 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 1979) (preliminary injunction
granted against enforcement of the Illinois statute because it imposed a substantial burden
on interstate commerce); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1341
(E.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979) (serious doubts as to the constitutionality of state takeover statutes).
137. See Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing preliminary injunction against enforcement of Virginia statute); AMCA Int'l. Corp. v. Krouse, 482
F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (rejecting AMCA's challenge to the Ohio Tender Offer Act on
preemption and commerce clause grounds). The court was of the opinion that the Ohio Act
was consonant with the Williams Act policy of investor protection, did not conflict with its
operation and that Congress had not evinced a desire to restrict non-conflicting state takeover legislation. Id. at 937-38.
138. See Tyco Labs., Inc. v. Connelly, 473 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mass. 1979) (declining to
decide the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute on grounds of "mootness").
139. See SEC Release No. 34-16384, FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 82,373 (Nov. 29, 1979).
These rules, most notably Rule 14d-2, became effective Jan. 7, 1980.
140. Id. at 82,584.
141. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), a/I'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982).
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"market approach" to investor protection. 4 2 Furthermore, the
Seventh Circuit balanced "Illinois' tenuous interest in protecting
resident shareholders and regulating control transfers" against the
statute's "significant potential to cause commercial disruption" of
interstate commerce, and concluded that the Illinois statute violated the commerce clause. 143 On June 23, 1982, in Edgar v. MITE
Corp.,1 44 the United States Supreme Court found the "Illinois Business Takeover Act" to be unconstitutional under the commerce
clause by a five-to-four vote, reasoning that the burden on interstate commerce outweighed the putative local benefits of the
statute.'4 5
The final step in the invalidation of state tender offer regulation
came with the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Bendix Corp. v.
Martin Marietta Corp.,"O in which the court held that a Maryland
statute was unconstitutional even if applied only to enjoin
purchases from state residents.1 47 The court reasoned that the Maryland statute indirectly burdened interstate commerce by
preventing Maryland shareholders from participating in nationwide tender offers, and effectively defeated tender offers of out-ofstate residents that needed the shares of Maryland shareholders to
48
make the tender offer successful.
When a state statute regulates or burdens interstate commerce
indirectly, the burden imposed must not be excessive in relation to
the local putative benefits of the state statute. 1 9 Because an inci142. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 491-98. The court felt that the provision allowing the Secretary of State to pass upon the substantive fairness of the tender offer conflicted with the Williams Act aim of promoting an unfettered choice among informed investors; that this aim was also hampered by the provision granting target management the
right to call hearings; and, that the twenty-five day precommencement notice and hearing
provisions gave target management a powerful weapon with which to cause delay. Id.
143. Id. at 502.
144. 454 U.S. 624 (1982).
145. Id. The Supreme Court felt that the most obvious burden of the Illinois Act arose
from its extraterritorial effect which empowered the state to block nationwide tender offers.
Id. at 643. Furthermore, the local benefits supposed to flow from this Act were of questionable value since the Williams Act provided the same substantive protections. Id. at 644. Finally, the possible benefits of the delays imposed by the Act were outweighed by the increased risk that the offer would fail due to incumbent management's defensive tactics. Id.
at 645.
146. 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982).
147. Id. at 532.
148. Id.
149. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643. See also Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S.
137, where the Court intimated that a statute which has only an incidental effect on interstate commerce is valid "unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits." Id. See also LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note
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dental effect on interstate commerce is unavoidable, MITE and
Martin Marietta seem to indicate that all state takeover legislation is unconstitutional, even if applied to wholly intrastate offers
and purchases. 150
Yet states persist in their attempts to regulate tender offers affecting their residents and local businesses, thus illustrating the
parochial nature of such legislation and posing familiar problems
regarding the proper balance between state and federal power. 151
V.

INVALID STATE TENDER OFFER LEGISLATION

The following areas of state tender offer legislation have been
found to be preempted by federal law:
1. Disclosure requirements. The imposition of additional disclosure requirements under state tender offer legislation, even though
supplemental to the Williams Act," 2 has been declared unconstitutional.15 It has been pointed out that "[ejxcessive disclosure requirements may accomplish more harm than good by confusing
shareholders," and that "[d]isclosure of a mass of irrelevant
data
'1 54
can confuse the investor and obscure relevant disclosures.'

2. Precommencement Waiting Periods. Without having
decided the preemption issue of Rule 14d-2(b), 155 the
Court has held nevertheless that waiting periods between
date and an offer's effective date imposed under state

expressly'
Supreme
the filing
law may

13, at § 5.01, 5-3.
150. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 3 §§ IIV, ch. 10 § I (2d ed. 1983).
151. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
152. See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (the
Missouri Act required substantially more disclosure than the Williams Act, including "such
additional information as the Commissioner may require as necessary in the public interest
or for the protection of investors," Id. at 1131); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1
(S.D. Ind. 1978) (provision requiring disclosure of the offeror's financial condition and history invalidated).
153. National City Lines, 687 F.2d at 1132. The court stated: "The S.E.C. has attempted to write disclosure requirements that provide enough material information without
producing reports so detailed and complicated that few shareholders would want to read
them .... That judgment is a legislative one." Id. (citing Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell,
577 F.2d at 1280-81 (citations omitted)). Missouri's attempt to second guess that judgment
was invalid, National City Lines, Inc., 687 F.2d at 1132. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
154. Great W. United Corp., 577 F.2d at 1280 (citing Hearings on S-510 [the Williams
Act] Before Subcommittee on Banking and Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 205 (1967))
(Senate Hearings, statement of Mr. Cohen). Accord Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F.
Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
155. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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contribute to a state statute being held unconstitutional as creating an undue burden on interstate commerce. 1' 6 The requirements
imposed by such a provision may "prevent prompt disclosure of
crucial information to the shareholders and through delay, ...
shift the advantage in [the] struggle to incumbent
management."'157
3. Offer DurationProvisions. Provisions extending the time an offer must be kept open beyond that period required under the Williams Act are preempted because they directly conflict with the
Williams Act and serve to delay completion of the offer. 58
4. Administrative Hearing Provisions. State provisions requiring
an administrative hearing at the target's request have been held
invalid. 159 Such provisions allow target management, interested in
preserving control, 60 to use the state tender offer statutes to delay
and defeat the offer."' It follows from this that these hearings are
unlikely to provide shareholders with much protection since they
are called pursuant to the interests of incumbent management and
tend to substitute administrative judgment for that of informed
156. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
157. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1980). A similar precommencement waiting period in the Delaware Tender Offers Act; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §
203(2)(2), calling for a twenty-day precommencement period was invalidated in Dart Indus.,
Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
Congress specifically considered and rejected the requirement that an offeror make a public disclosure of a proposed tender offer prior to the commencement of the offer because it
might delay the offer when time is of the essence. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1967). Moreover, there is no federal requirement of disclosure before the offer commences.
See also National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC, Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (striking
down a twenty day precommencement waiting and notice provision because it and associated provisions upset the balance between target and offeror by granting target management
time to take defensive action); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981)
(invalidating thirty day precommencement notice provision).
158. See Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978). The stricken
Delaware provision required the offer to be kept open for at least twenty days (DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8 § 203(a)(2), (a)(3) (Supp. 1979)) while the Williams Act requires an offer to remain open for seven or ten days (15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(5), (6) (1982)).
159. See Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta, 547 F. Supp. 522, 529 (D. Md. 1982). See
also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (allowing the Secretary of State to pass upon
a the substantive fairness of a tender offer protects the investor at the expense of his own
autonomy and is thus at odds with the congressional intent behind sections 13(d) and (e) of
the Williams Act); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va.
1982) ("The purpose of the 1934 Act is to insure full and fair disclosure, not the fairness of
any transaction." Id. at 803).
160. See Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their
Constitutionality,45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1976).
161. See E. ARANOW, supra note 86, at 265-66. See also Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507
F. Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981) (such a provision violates the principles of evenhanded regulation envisioned by the Williams Act).
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shareholders, contrary to the purposes of the Williams Act.16 2
Hearing and automatic stay provisions which allow the target's incumbent management to unilaterally stop or delay an offer are also
preempted.163
5. Withdrawal Rights of Tendering Shareholders.Those state provisions addressing withdrawal rights are problematic due to increased offeror uncertainty in evaluating the probability of the offer's success."' Because the federal objective of the disclosure
requirements is to benefit all shareholders, the avowed objective
behind these withdrawal provisions of protecting unsophisticated
investors (who are more likely to tender early) is too attenuated to
survive commerce clause analysis.'6 5 Moreover, withdrawal provisions which delay the completion of a tender offer beyond the period prescribed by federal law only benefit target management and
contravene the mutual policy of the Williams Act. 66
6. ProrationProvisions. These provisions, which delay consummation of a tender offer to the advantage of incumbent management,
are invalid because they conflict with the policy of neutrality underlying the Williams Act.'6 7 Like withdrawal provisions, they tend
to delay the completion of a tender offer beyond the period prescribed by federal law. 6 "
162.
required
made to
163.
weapons

See Gunter v. Ago Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (the Florida Act
approval of the Department of Insurance before any form of tender offer could be
security holders).
See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981) (such potent
in the hands of incumbent management contradict the neutral market approach

embodied in the Williams Act).
164. See Beckman, supra note 124, at 530 n.125.
165. Id. at 531.
166. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. at 1220-21. While the Williams Act
and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide that a shareholder depositing shares
with an offeror may withdraw them within fifteen business days of the commencement of
the offer, the New Jersey Takeover Law allowed shareholders to withdraw their shares up to
three days prior to the conclusion of the offer and was thus invalid. Id. at 1221-22. See also
Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (invalidation of a Delaware
provision granting withdrawal rights to shareholders throughout the duration of the offer).
Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982) (tendered securities may only be withdrawn within seven
days after the offer is first published or at any time after sixty days).
167. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
49:5-9(b) (West Supp. 1985) (if the offer ever becomes overprescribed, all shares must be
accepted by the offeror pro rata). Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 7an(d)(6) (1982); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (invalidation of a similar provision confronting the
Kennecott court); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 203(a)(3) (1983) (permitting proration rights to
extend through the life of the tender offer).
168. Kennecott Corp., 507 F. Supp. at 1221-22. ("It is clear that the short ten day
period for proration required by § 14(d)(6) of the Securities Act of 1934 was founded on
congressional concern that a longer period would unduly favor target management.") Edgar
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7. Subsequent Offer Provisions. A state provision discriminates
against an offeror if it allows subsequent or competing offerors to
purchase securities pursuant to their competing offer at the same
time the original offeror is permitted to purchase them, without
requiring the subsequent offeror to comply with the same waiting
requirement applicable to the original offeror. 169 This contravenes
the policy of not discouraging tender offers which underlies the
170
Williams Act.
8. Exceptions for Target Management Approved Tender Offers. A
state provision which excepts from the disclosure requirements
those tender offers approved by target management impermissibly
favors the target company, and allows tender offers to proceed
completely without disclosing any information to investors.1 71 Such
provisions are wholly inconsistent with the federal regulatory objective of protecting the shareholder through disclosure
requirements.
9. Exceptions for Self Tenders. Edgar v. MITE ' 2 held that since
the Illinois Act exempted from coverage a corporation's acquisition
of its own shares, the argument that the purpose of the Illinois Act
was to protect investors was undermined. The MITE court reasoned that a local corporation would be able to make a competing
tender offer for its own stock without complying with the state Act
and that its shareholders would be left with only the protections
afforded them by federal securities law.17 Because this allows target management to initiate a self tender to defeat an outside offer
without providing disclosure to target shareholders, such an exception for self tenders would unfairly benefit incumbent
management.
In brief, all the state provisions that have been invalidated have
tended to delay completion of tender offers, and have thus supplied an undue advantage in the takeover struggle to incumbent
management. Some invalid provisions conflict so directly with the
Williams Act that they cannot stand as originally enacted. Nonetheless, the states have persisted in their efforts to regulate tender
offers, and have employed a variety of tactics to protect the effectiveness of such legislation.
v. MITE
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Corp., 457 U.S. at 638.
Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. at 532.
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
Id. at 644.
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Two of the most common measures that have been taken to protect the enforceability of state takeover statutes are reinterpretation and statutory amendment aimed at avoiding conflict with the
federal law. One approach required the offeror not to disclose the
amount of consideration to be paid or the class of securities addressed by the offer in the filing required under state law. 174 The
purpose behind this approach was to bring the announcement of
the offer within the "safe harbor" provision of the S.E.C.'s 1979
rules so that the offeror would not have to commence its offer
17
within five days of the filing. 5
Another approach was to provide for confidential treatment of
all materials filed so as to prevent the occurrence of a "public announcement" under the S.E.C. rules. 17 6 An offer could also be allowed to commence without prior registration or a pre-commencement waiting period provided the purchases were conditioned
17 7
upon subsequent registration and hearings.
Other states have amended their regulations or statutes to eliminate the waiting period before commencement of the offer altogether, with the hope that this would avoid the direct conflict with
17 8
the Williams Act and the S.E.C. rules.
One state even enacted emergency legislation to allow the state
securities commissioner to exempt transactions from the state
takeover law if necessary to make its application reasonably compatible with federal law. 179 Under this approach, the Commission
would require only a limited short-form registration twenty days
prior to the commencement of the offer, with a full registration
statement to be filed by the date on which the offer would have
commenced under Rule 14d-2.180
174. Wisconsin was the first state to use this approach, effective Feb. 15, 1980. New
Jersey followed suit, but to no avail. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206
(D.N.J. 1981).
175. Rule 14d-2(d) provides that a public announcement does not commence a tender
offer if it only identifies the offeror or the'target and states an intention to make a tender
offer in the future. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(d) (1984).
176. Wisconsin used this approach in conjunction with its "safe harbor" approach. See
supra note 169 and accompanying text.
177. The S.E.C. takes the position that nothing in its rules prohibits an offer from
being conditioned upon the offeror receiving regulatory approval. SEC Release No. 3416623, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 24,284 I, at 17,758 (Mar. 5, 1980)(Question" 5). Nevertheless, an offeror must be prepared at all times to accept shares for deposit. Id. (Question 7).
178. Massachusetts, Mississippi and New York have statutorily eliminated the
precommencement waiting period.
179. Maryland enacted this bill on April 8, 1980. See BLUE SKY L. Rp. (CCH)
30,563, at 25,577 (April 18, 1980).
180. This approach and the Maryland statute were invalidated on commerce and
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CONCLUSION

The current status of the law is that no state may regulate
tender offers in such a way as to affect securities transactions between out-of-state offerors and out-of-state shareholders. A state
cannot enforce a takeover statute unless the target has very strong
contacts with that state. Even then, state regulations must comport with Rule 14d-2 under the 1934 Act; they must not preclude
or postpone the commencement of the offer. Further, the state regulatory process must be completed prior to termination of the offer
in order to avoid conflicting with the federal regulatory scheme.
Because tender offers typically involve shares traded on national
exchanges, they are "commercial transactions taking place in a national market." ' Since state regulation protects only the interests
of the residents within that state, yet (impermissibly) infringes on
the rights of extraterritorial parties, there is a need for evenhanded, unbiased regulation. National regulation would eliminate
the problem of an offeror's required compliance with several possibly conflicting state regulatory processes when the offer affects
shareholders in several states.
In view of these considerations, it would appear likely that federal regulation of tender offers will continue to expand, displacing
still more state regulation in this area.18 2 The clearly established
position of the Securities Exchange Commission is that takeover
regulation should favor neither acquiror nor target, and should reflect that takeovers take place in a national securities market. 8 3
Further, the Commission has advised that state regulation of takeovers should be confined to local companies.'" Thus, while state
supremacy clause grounds in Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D.
Md. 1982).
181. Dart Indus., Inc., 462 F. Supp. at 10.
182. For the most recent proposed amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the Williams Act, known as the Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984, see D.J. BLOCK
supra note 79 at 666-68.
183. Id. at 572.
184. Id. at 574. The authors note that "to the extent necessary to eliminate abuses or
interference with the intended functioning of federal takeover regulation, federal takeover
regulation should not preempt or override state corporate law. Essentially, the business
judgment rule should continue to govern most such activity." Id. at 574-75. Additionally,
the authors note:
[Flederal takeover regulation should not preempt substantive state regulation of
banks, utilities, insurance companies, and similar businesses, where the change of
control provisions of such state regulation are justified in relation to the overall objectives of the industry being regulated, do not conflict with. . . federal takeover regulation and relate to a significant portion of the issuer's business.
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corporate law is not yet wholly preempted, we may expect continued expansion of federal regulation as it concerns market participants, offerors seeking control and the use of tender offer defensive
tactics.
John J. Winter

Id. at 575.

